

## National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594
Safety Recommendation

1192139

Date: December 7, 1989
In reply refer to: A-89-135

Honorable James B. Busey Administrator Federal Aviation Administration Washington, D.C. 20591

On November 13, 1988, a Piper PA-28-181 (Archer), N8342L, registered to and operated by TAJ FBO Corporation of Brunswick, Georgia, crashed adjacent to runway 7 while attempting a missed approach from an ILS approach at the Jacksonville International Airport, Jacksonville, Florida. The flight was conducted as an air taxi under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135. The aircraft was destroyed, and the pilot and his three passengers were killed.1/

Accident investigators determined that the airplane's weight at takeoff from Brunswick was 2,640 pounds, with a center of gravity (c.g.) location 93.5 inches aft of datum. The maximum allowable takeoff weight for the airplane was 2,550 pounds; the aft c.g. limit was 93 inches. Investigators determined that the airplane weight at the time of the accident was 2,605 pounds, and the c.g. location was 93.5 inches aft of datum. The Safety Board is unable to determine the extent to which the airplane's weight and balance condition contributed to the accident.

Title 14 CFR 135.63(c) states: "For multiengine aircraft, each certificate holder is responsible for the preparation and accuracy of a load manifest in duplicate containing information concerning the loading of the aircraft. The manifest must be prepared before each takeoff..." Because N8342L was a single-engine airplane, there was no requirement that a load manifest be prepared for the flight. In fact, there was no evidence that the pilot performed any weight and balance calculations prior to departure.

The Safety Board has investigated numerous accidents involving singleengine aircraft, operated under Part 135, in which "weight and/or c.g." was cited in the probable cause of the accident, or as a contributing factor. Examples of such accidents include:

1) On June 4, 1973, a Piper PA-32, N8903N, crashed during takeoff from Elim, Alaska. Twice during

1/NTSB Field Accident Report MIA89FA033, Brief No. 1862 (attached).

the takeoff roll the airplane became airborne, and finally settled into the ground, despite calm wind conditions. The airplane was determined to have been 1,339 pounds above the maximum allowable gross takeoff weight. The airplane was destroyed in the accident.

- 2) On March 30, 1977, a Cessna 207, N91073, was destroyed, and the pilot was killed when the failed to maintain flight subsequent airplane takeoff Dekalb Peachtree Airport. from The Safety Board determined Atlanta, Georgia. that the probable cause of the accident was the result of the airplane being 790 pounds maximum allowable gross takeoff the weight, and the c.g. beyond the aft limit.
- 3) On July 17, 1984, a Helio H-250, N6321V, operated by Wright Air Service, Inc., descended uncontrolled into the ground after takeoff from Fairbanks, Alaska. The investigation determined that the aircraft was 392 pounds over its maximum allowable over its maximum allowable gross takeoff weight, and the c.g. location was 5.13 inches aft of the aft limit.

A review of Safety Board records from 1967-1988 indicated 104 accidents involving Part 135 operators in which the Safety Board determined that the weight and balance condition of the aircraft was causal or a contributing factor to the accident. Forty-three of the accidents involved single-engine Safety Board can find no aircraft. Accordingly, the Safety Board can find no justification for excluding single-engine aircraft operated under 14 CFR Part 135 from the requirement of preparing a load manifest before departure. Since weight and balance is a limitation that all pilots must consider before flight, the Safety Board does not believe this to be burdensome for Part 135 operators. The Safety Board believes that the benefits of requiring operators of singleengine aircraft to prepare a load manifest would be twofold: (1) flightcrews would have a stronger incentive to perform weight and balance calculations, and (2) the requirement to retain the load manifest for 30 days would provide for more effective Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) surveillance of aircraft loading operations, thereby applying more incentive to operators to conduct accurate weight and balance calculations.

When it substantially re-wrote Part 135 in 1978, the FAA's rationale for excluding single-engine aircraft from the requirements of Part 135.63(c) was the greater criticality in loading requirements of multiengine aircraft. However, with the introduction of larger single-engine airplanes that require much stricter adherence to proper loading procedures, such as the Cessna Caravan and Piper Malibu, the Safety Board believes that it would now be appropriate to amend 14 CFR Part 135.63(c) to include single-engine aircraft.

Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

Amend 14 CFR 135.63(c) to require operators of single-engine aircraft to comply with the requirements therein for preparation of a load manifest before each takeoff. (Class II, Priority Action)(A-89-135)

KOLSTAD, Acting Chairman, BURNETT, LAUBER, and DICKINSON, Members, concurred in this recommendation.

James L. Kolstad Acting Chairman Mational Transportation Safety Roard: Washington: 1.C. 20594

## Brief of Accident

11/13/88 JACK	SONUILLEFL	AZC Ros. No. MR342L	2.L	Time (Lc1)	- 2053 EST	E 10 07 III 74 III 74 III 74 III 74 III 74 III
Type Operating Certificate-ON-DEMANN AIR TAXI Type Operating Certificate-ON-DEMANN AIR TAXI Name of Carrier Type of Operation Flight Conducted Under -14 CFR 135 Accident Occurred Uniting -APPROACH	-ON-DEMAND AIR TAXI -TAJ FBO CORPNON SCHED, DOMESTIC, PASSENGER -14 CFR 135	Atteraft Damade DESTROYED Fire NONE	Fatal Fass	Injuries al Serious M  1 0 0 3	7165 Minor 0 0	Norre 0 0
しただしだな	Eng Make/Model Number Engines Engine Tyre Rated Fower	del - LYCOMING 0-3¢0-A4M nes - 1 - RECIPROCATING-CAEBURETOR - 180 HF	URETOR	ELT Installed/Activated Stall Warning System - YES	activated - System - YE	- YES/YES
Weather Data  Weather Data  Without Completeness - UNK/NK  Basic Weather - IMC  Wind Dr/Speed- 040/003 KTS  Visibility - ,250 SK  Lowest Sky/Clouds - FART ORS  Lowest Ceiling - 100 FT BROKEN  Obstructions to Vision- FOG  Frecipitation - NONE  Condition of Light - NIGHT(DARK)	Itinerary Last Des BRUNSW Destinati JACKSG Type of Type of	anture Foint on NVILLE,FL Ice Flisht Plan - IFR Clearance - IFR sh/Lnds - ILS-COMFLETE	A 1 A 1	Airport Proximity OFF AIRFORT/STRIP Airport Data JACKSONVILLE INT' Runway Ident Runway Eurface Runway Status	L 07 8000/ ASFHALT DRY	150
Pilot-In-Command Certificate(s)/Rating(s) COMMERCIAL SE LAND, ME LAND	Ade - 39 Biennial Flidht Review Current - YE Months Since - 4 Aircraft Tyre - FA	ທ ເ ເາ ໝ	tificate - VALID MEDI Flight Time (Hours) - 1580 del- 50 ont- 310	CAL- asst	NO WATVERS/L 24 Hrs - 30 Days- 90 Days-	ድ ጣ 4 ጠ ጣ የነን

## Instrument Rating(s) - AIRFLANE

DEG A NGT AFRIVAL, THE PLT REQUESTED A SPECIAL VER CLNC TO THE ARPT & WGS ADZD THE WY WAS PARTIALLY OBSCURED, VISUAL INTHEMER AND TROPPED TO 1/2 MI. THE PLT RELIABLE OF HIS HAD TROPPED TO 1/2 MI. THE PLT RELIABLE OF THE WAS 1200 THE WAS 1200 THUCHDOWN. MID-POINT 1000 & ROLLOUT 1500. CONTACT WITH THE ACFT WAS LOST AS IT APCHD THE ARPT, LATER, THE ACFT WAS FND WHERE IT HAD COLLIDED WITH TREES & CRASHED APRX 1400 FT LEFT OF THE RWY & 500 FT PAST THE THFESHOLD. AN INU RFUEALED THAT INITIAL IMPACT WAS IN A LUL ATTITUME. AN EXAM OF THE ACFT WE HERE FULLY RETRACTED & THE THROTTLE WAS FULL OPEN. PROF DANGE INDCO THERE WAS ROTATION AT HIGH RPM DURING IMPACT. RECORDS SHOWED THE ACFT HAD AN INDF THRN CHARDEN. NO OTHER PART FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION WAS EVIDENT. A CHECK OF THE WAS APRX 55 LBS QUER THE MAX GROSS WILLIMITATION & THE CENTER-OF-GRAVITY (CG) WAS APRX 55 LBS QUER THE MAX BROSS WILLIMITATION & THE AFT LIMITAL ----Narrative----

Brief of Accident (Continued)

File No. -1962 11/13/88 JACKSONVILLE, FL

A/C Red. No. N8342L Time (Lc1) - 2053 EST

Occurrence #1 Phase of Operation APPROACH IN FLIGHT COLLISION WITH OBJECT

Finding(s)

AIRCRAFT WEIGHT AND BALANCE - IMFROPER - PILOT IN COMMAND FLIGHT/NAY INSTRUMENTS, TURN AND BANK INDICATOR - INOFERATIVE

OPERATION WITH KNOWN DEFICIENCIES IN EQUIPMENT - PERFORMED - PILOT IN COMMAND

4. LIGHT CONDITION - NIGHT S. WEATHER CONDITION - LOW 6. WEATHER CONDITION - FOR 7. WEATHER CONDITION - OBSC WEATHER CONDITION - LOW CEILING

WEATHER CONDITION - FOR URATION

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į. IFR PROCEDURE - IMPROPER - PILOT IN COMMAND PROPER ALIGNMENT - NOT MAINTAINED - PILOT IN COMMAND DECISION HEIGHT - IMPROPER USE OF - PILOT IN COMMAND OBJECT - TREE(S)

MISSED AFFROACH - MOT ATTAINED - PILOT IN COMMAND

---Probable Cause----

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the Frobable Couse(s) of this accident is/one finding(s) 8r10r12

Fector(s) relating to this accident is/are finding(s) 2:3:4:5-6:7:9:11

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